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Highlights 
•	 An	emerging	broad	range	of	technologies	for	distributed	energy	
resources	(DER)	is	causing	significant	changes	in	the	planning	
and	operation	of	power	systems.	These	changes	cause	challenges	
for	power	systems	and	regulators	alike.	However,	DER	–	with	
the	right	regulation	and	market	design	–	can	at	the	same	time	
be	exploited	to	establish	a	more	efficient	and	cleaner	electricity	
system	than	our	current	one.	To	this	end	this	THINK	report	
discusses	how	adjustments	to	the	regulation	of	European	DSOs	
can	incentivize	the	latter	to	effectively	integrate	DER	into	elec-
tricity	markets	and	system	management.
•	 A	sound	regulation	that	incentivizes	DSOs	to	exploit	DER	for	a	
more	active	system	management	has	to	take	account	of	chang-
ing	OPEX	and	CAPEX	structures,	the	optimal	choice	among	
both,	and	of	how	to	incentivize	DSOs	to	favor	innovative	solu-
tions.	Furthermore,	as	grid	users	are	becoming	more	complex	
and	sophisticated	agents,	distribution	cost	should	be	recovered	
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via	grid	tariffs	that	reflect	the	true	costs	(or	benefits)	of	different	
types	of	load	and	generation	for	the	system.	
•	 As	the	complexity	of	the	system	increases	with	an	increasing	
DER	penetration,	an	insufficiently	unbundled	DSO	could	either	
stay	with	a	restricted	set	of	traditional	system	tasks,	or	the	DSO	
could	expand	its	portfolio	of	activities,	but	be	accompanied	with	
stricter	requirements	for	unbundling.	
•	 The	general	responsibilities	of	network	operators	with	respect	
to	grid	management	do	not	change,	but	the	set	of	tools	available	
to	perform	their	tasks	is	enriched	by	DER.	Products	that	system	
operators	use	to	ensure	reliable	grids	should	be	clearly	defined	
in	terms	of	geography	and	timing.	Procedures	of	coordination	
between	DSOs	and	TSOs	have	to	be	updated.	
•	 In	the	European	context,	regulation	should	be	kept	at	minimum	
level.	We	see	neither	the	justification	nor	even	the	conveni-
ence	for	an	EU-wide	harmonization	of	the	regulation	of	DSOs.	
However,	we	recommend	setting	clear	minimum	requirements	
in	a	few	key	regulatory	aspects,	as	well	as	the	publication	of	EU	
guidelines	to	spread,	encourage,	and	monitor	good	regulatory	
practices	in	some	of	the	critical	areas	identified.	
•
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Background
Technological	 advances	 are	 reshaping	 today’s	 elec-
tricity	 markets.	 More	 mature	 technologies	 for	 lo-
cal	renewable	generation	and	decreased	investment	
costs	 thereof,	 joint	with	national	 support	 schemes,	
led	to	a	significant	market	penetration	of	distributed	
generation	in	many	EU	countries.	Not	only	distrib-
uted	generation	but	a	newly	emerging	broad	range	of	
distributed	energy	 resources	 (DER),	 including	also	
local	storage,	electric	vehicles	or	demand	response,	
are	 driving	 or	 at	 least	 allowing	 for	 potentially	 sig-
nificant	changes	in	the	operation	of	power	systems.	
Today,	 some	 challenges	 are	 only	 a	 possibility,	 and	
might	arise	once	technologies	mature	and	are	more	
widely	deployed.	Other	challenges,	foremost	related	
to	distributed	generation	and,	for	example,	resulting	
volatile	power	flows,	are	already	established	facts	ob-
servable	in	many	EU	distribution	systems.	However,	
the	 same	 technologies	 that	 are	 causing	 substantial	
challenges	 for	power	 systems	 and	 regulators	 can	–	
with	the	right	regulation	and	market	design	–	be	ex-
ploited	to	establish	a	more	efficient	and	also	cleaner	
electricity	system	than	our	current	one.	
In	 the	 light	 of	 these	 changes,	 this	 THINK	 report	
discusses	 regulatory	 implications	of	 changing	 local	
electricity	markets.	To	 this	end	 this	 report	 sets	 the	
focal	point	on	electricity	distribution	system	opera-
tors	(DSOs)	as	regulated	local	entities	and	local	mar-
ket	facilitators.	First,	we	shed	light	on	where	the	cur-
rent	regulation	of	DSOs	needs	updates	to	allow	for	
welfare-enhancing	DER	technologies	to	be	adapted	
efficiently	and	in	a	timely	fashion.	A	major	challenge	
is	to	revisit	regulation	such	that	distribution	compa-
nies	are	not	negatively	affected	by	the	development	
of	DER	and	are	incentivized	to	foster	the	integration	
of	viable	new	technologies	into	the	market.	Moreo-
ver,	updates	are	needed	to	provide	the	right	regula-
tory	tools	to	DSOs	such	that	they	can	benefit	from	
the	services	DER	can	offer	for	system	operation	and	
planning.	Ultimately,	the	priority	task	of	regulation	
is	not	 to	 try	 to	predict	what	 the	 future	will	be,	but	
to	design	incentives	that	make	possible	all	welfare-
enhancing	business	models	under	any	future	market	
development.	
Figure 1: Relevant areas of regulation
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Existing regulation of DSOs needs to be 
reviewed in its full spectrum
The	market	penetration	of	DER	opens	possibilities	
for	decentralized	trade	of	energy.	These	trade	oppor-
tunities	 allow	 for	new	business	models,	mainly	 re-
lated	to	the	aggregation	and	marketing	of	DER.	Also	
DSOs	can	profit	from	employing	DER	resources	in	
their	daily	tasks	of	ensuring	system	functioning	and	
grid	investments.	However,	to	exploit	the	full	range	
of	 potentials	 that	DER	offer,	DSOs	have	 to	 under-
take	 significant	 upfront	 investments	 in	 grid	 (and	
Box 1: Electricity distribution in the EU – A patchwork of national systems
Today’s DSO landscape resembles a patchwork with diverse national implementations of relevant pieces of EU leg-
islation and resulting heterogeneous end-user market structures in different Member States. Substantial differences 
regard, amongst others, operated voltage levels, designation procedures, the scope of activities, the size and number 
of DSOs in a country, the level of unbundling, and applied regulatory schemes. Also the degree of retail market liberali-
zation and competition still varies significantly across the EU, even though full eligibility of customers is mandatory, and 
the choice of suppliers and tariffs generally increased over the recent years. 
Boundary	between	transmission	and	distribution	in	terms	of	operated	voltage	levels:	
200
132 132 132 130
110 110 110 110
70 65
30 20
0
50
100
150
200
250 Voltage level [kV]
Data source: DG-Grid (2007)
"Regulatory improvements for 
effective integration of DG into 
electricity distribution networks"
Total	number	of	DSOs	in	selected	Member	States:
883
342
308
170 151 148 131 128
95 76
41 37 26 21 13 8 6 6 6 4 1 1
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900  Total number DSOs
 Less than 100,000
connected customers
Data source: DG-Grid (2007)
"Regulatory improvements for 
effective integration of DG into 
electricity distribution networks"
5 ■   Florence School of Regulation    
related)	infrastructures.	For	DER	to	flourish	and	to	
enable	 them	 to	 compete	with	 resources	 connected	
to	the	transmission	grid,	DSOs	also	have	to	provide	
adequate	 conditions	 for	network	 access	 and	usage.	
The	latter	also	includes	adequate	conditions	for	new	
business	models	related	to	the	aggregation	of	DER.	
Successful	integration	of	these	new	business	models	
may	potentially	 even	 lead	 to	 a	 paradigm	 shift	 that	
might	shake	up	the	traditional	value	chain	and	cause	
a	radical	change	of	the	power	market	architecture	as	
we	know	it	today,	replacing	traditional	downstream	
marketing	of	power	by	increasing	reliance	on	local	
sources.
As	 a	 consequence,	 existing	 regulation	 needs	 to	 be	
reviewed	in	its	full	spectrum.	This	full	spectrum	of	
DSO	 activities	 can	 be	 distinguished	 according	 to,	
first,	the	DSO’s	function	as	a	network	operator	and,	
second,	its	function	as	a	market	facilitator	along	the	
value	 chain	 (see	 Figure	 1).	 Reviewing	DSO	 incen-
tives	as	a	network	operator	implies	revisiting	regula-
tory	schemes	for	allowed	remuneration	and	result-
ing	 incentives	 to	 invest	 and	 to	 innovate,	 as	well	 as	
revisiting	network	tariff	design.	DSOs	are	a	natural	
monopoly	for	which	allowed	remuneration	has	to	be	
regulated.	This	allowed	revenue	will	be	collected	via	
grid	charges	and	 the	structure	and	 format	of	 these	
charges	will	have	an	important	impact	on	grid	users’	
behavior.	 In	 contrast,	 reviewing	DSO	 incentives	 as	
a	key	player	along	the	value	chain	implies	revisiting	
the	regulatory	base	of	DSOs	both	vis-à-vis	the	trans-
mission	system	operator	(TSO)	and	vis-à-vis	energy	
and	power	markets.	
However,	 a	 common	 European	 approach	 to	 DSO	
regulation	 is	 hampered	 by	 substantially	 heteroge-
neous	 existing	 regulation	 and	 distribution	 system	
structures	 throughout	 the	EU.	Box	1	 illustrates	 the	
patchwork	of	different	national	distribution	systems.	
Therefore,	 the	 advent	 of	DER	will	 have	 a	 different	
impact	on	different	European	distribution	systems,	
and	hence,	 also	 regulatory	 responses	 should	differ,	
and	when	implemented	on	the	European	level,	leave	
room	for	diverse	national	implementation.	
System-specific	 regulatory	 responses	 are	 needed	
because	it	will	make	a	difference	whether	adequate	
DSO	remuneration	and	distribution	tariff	design,	or	
infrastructure	tasks	of	DSOs	(that	is,	their	regulated	
asset	base)	are	discussed	within	a	simpler	system	ar-
chitecture,	or	whether	in	contrast	system	complexi-
ties	 increase	with	 the	massive	penetration	of	DER.	
At	one	extreme	are	areas	without	a	noteworthy	pen-
etration	of	DER	and	where	investments	in	distribu-
tion	grids	are	solely	motivated	by	a	renewal	of	aging	
infrastructure	and	the	connection	of	new	consum-
ers.	At	 the	other	extreme,	 there	are	 systems	with	a	
substantial	penetration	of	DER	and	small-scale	con-
sumers	behaving	as	 active	prosumers.	 In	 such	 sys-
tems	power	flows	will	 become	much	more	volatile	
and	 the	 approach	 to	 system	management	 changes,	
with	 DSOs	 jointly	 coordinating	 local	 DER	 power	
flows	and	those	coming	from	the	transmission	grid,	
and	hence	managing	the	system	closer	to	real-time.
It	 also	 will	 make	 a	 difference	 for	 adequate	 future	
regulation	whether	the	respective	DSO	is	subject	to	
(voluntary)	ownership	unbundling	as	is	the	case	in	
the	Netherlands,	or	whether	in	contrast	it	is	a	small	
integrated	 operator	 being	 exempted	 from	 strict	
unbundling	 provisions.	 This	 for	 instance	 often	 is	
the	case	for	small	German	(“Stadtwerke”)	or	Span-
ish	 (“Cooperativas”)	utilities,	which	 also	 engage	 in	
other-than-energy	social	activities	within	 their	 ter-
ritory.	Insufficient	unbundling	biases	the	level-play-
ing	field	against	DER	and	 in	 favor	of	 conventional	
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technologies	especially	when	the	incumbent	retailer	
(that	 shares	 the	parent	firm	with	 the	DSO)	mostly	
markets	 electricity	 from	 upstream	 sources,	 and,	
thus,	poses	one	of	the	most	serious	obstacles	to	retail	
competition.
Key areas of DSO regulation and needed 
changes for DER integration
As	demonstrated	above,	four	key	areas	of	DSO	regu-
lation	have	 to	 be	 assessed	on	whether	 they	–	with	
massive	DER	penetration	–	still	deliver	the	desired	
regulatory	goals.
#1 – Adequate regulated DSO remuneration 
For	high	amounts	of	DER	connected	to	distribution	
systems,	 the	 total	 costs	 of	 business-as-usual	 man-
agement	of	distribution	networks	(that	is,	a	contin-
ued	 “fit-and-forget”	 grid	 management)	 will	 likely	
increase	 in	most	 systems.	 Yet,	 increasing	 amounts	
of	DER	have	a	twofold	impact	on	DSOs’	cost	struc-
tures:	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 substantial	 future	 invest-
ments	are	required	to	connect	all	new	resources,	to	
enable	the	system	to	deal	with	increased	volatility	of	
net	demand	and	peak	demand	fluctuations,	and	to	
set	 up	 ICT	 infrastructure	 that	 empowers	DSOs	 to	
employ	DER	for	their	daily	grid	operations.	On	the	
other	hand,	DER	at	the	same	time	offer	a	new	set	of	
instruments	for	grid	operation	and	thereby	a	tool	for	
DSOs	to	perform	their	 tasks	of	ensuring	a	reliable,	
secure	and	efficient	electricity	distribution.	Distrib-
uted	 energy	 resources	 allow	 for	 an	 active	distribu-
tion	system	management	and	have	the	potential	 to	
decrease	 the	 total	 costs	 of	DSOs	 compared	 to	 not	
relying	on	DER	in	local	system	management.	
Therefore,	 incentive	regulation	 for	DSOs	has	 to	al-
low	for	overall	higher	compensation	of	DSOs,	but	at	
the	 same	 time	 set	 sufficient	 incentives	 to	 invest	 in	
ICT	and	grid	 infrastructure	 in	order	 to	exploit	 the	
full	potentials	that	DER	offer	for	system	services	and	
hence	for	active	system	management.	Future	regula-
tion	hence	has	to	take	account	of	i) changing	OPEX	
and	 CAPEX	 structures	 of	 DSOs,	 ii)	 the	 optimal	
choice	 among	 both,	 and	 of	 iii)	 how	 to	 incentivize	
DSOs	to	deploy	innovative	solutions.
#2 – Adequate distribution network tarification 
The	present	design	of	network	tariffs	does	not	pro-
vide	a	 level-playing	field	among	all	 agents	 that	use	
the	 distribution	 network.	With	 an	 increasing	 pen-
etration	 of	DER,	 ill-designed	 distribution	 network	
charges,	 such	 as	 volumetric	network	 charges	 com-
bined	 with	 net-metering,	 will	 become	 even	 more	
problematic.	 Business	 models	 exploiting,	 for	 in-
stance,	 inefficient	 arbitrage	 possibilities	 caused	 by	
differentiated	treatments	of	different	DER	technolo-
gies,	or	of	certain	types	of	producers	and	consumers,	
might	flourish	 in	 the	absence	of	 sound	 tarification	
procedures.	
Moreover,	grid	users	are	becoming	complex,	sophis-
ticated	agents,	which	can	have	very	diverse	consump-
tion	and	production	patterns,	being	able	(and	will-
ing)	to	react	to	price	signals.	The	current	paradigm,	
exclusively	designed	for	pure	consuming	agents	and	
where	distributed	generation	was	considered	a	mi-
nor	 exception,	 does	 not	 hold	 anymore.	The	power	
system	of	the	future	(of	the	present	already	in	many	
countries)	will	be	much	more	complex	and	the	tariff	
design	paradigm	has	to	be	changed	before	much	effi-
ciency	distortion	is	created	and	many	agents	will	ac-
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quire	rights	to	ill-designed	subsidies.	A	continuation	
of	 traditional	 tarification	 methodologies	 applying	
widely	uniform	charges	over	the	whole	distribution	
system	and,	thus,	socializing	network	cost	among	all	
“consumers”,	would	imply	an	increasing	cross-subsi-
dization.	Such	practice	clearly	is	against	the	princi-
ples	of	cost-causality	and	economic	efficiency.
Instead,	grid	tariffs,	on	top	of	guaranteeing	full	cost	
recovery,	 should	 be	 able	 to	 convey	 efficient	 eco-
nomic	 signals	 to	 the	 entire	diversity	of	 agents	 that	
may	connect	to	the	distribution	grid.	Tariffs	should	
reflect	the	true	costs	(or	benefits)	of	different	types	
of	 load	and	generation	 for	 the	distribution	system,	
which	will	depend	on	an	agent’s	geographic	location	
in	the	system	as	well	as	on	the	profile	of	 injection/
withdrawal	 from	 the	 connection	point.	A	network	
reference	model,	 as	 for	 example	already	applied	 in	
Spain	or	Sweden,	can	be	very	useful	to	evaluate	the	
different	components	of	distribution	network	charg-
es.	When	 distribution	 costs	 are	 allocated	 to	 those	
who	cause	them	–	admittedly	not	a	simple	task	–	dis-
tribution	tariffs	will	induce	a	more	efficient	behavior	
of	grid	users.	Network	congestions	and	other	opera-
tional	problems	should	be	dealt	with	separately.	Any	
hidden	subsidies	should	be	removed	and	replaced	by	
sufficient	but	direct	subsidies	that	do	not	turn	into	
inefficient	signals.	Guidelines	for	a	fresh	approach	to	
network	tariff	design	are	proposed	in	the	report.	
#3 – DSO activities vis-à-vis the market
There	are	a	number	of	areas	in	the	newly	emerging	
market	 environment	 where	 there	 is	 no	 consensus	
about	whether	the	respective	tasks	should	be	under	
the	responsibility	of	 the	DSO	or	not.	Such	tasks	 in	
theory	may	be	 fulfilled	by	 regulated	agents	 (which	
could	be	the	DSO	or	also	a	third	regulated	party)	or	
by	non-regulated	ones.	The	 regulatory	 challenge	 is	
to	clearly	define	the	roles,	boundaries	and	responsi-
bilities	of	DSOs,	so	that	there	is	a	stable	level-playing	
field	for	all	potential	and	valuable	business	models.	
Different	proposed	(regulated	as	well	as	liberalized)	
models	 for	 (1)	 the	 ownership	 and	management	 of	
metering	equipment,	(2)	data	handling	and	(3)	EV	
charging	infrastructure	all	have	their	advantages	and	
disadvantages.	These	tasks	may	or	may	not	be	offered	
at	 lowest	cost	(due	to	sufficient	synergies	with	grid	
operation)	and/or	in	a	more	qualitative	way	by	the	
DSOs	as	compared	to	other	third	regulated	agents	or	
commercial	actors.	The	suitability	of	a	certain	model	
will	depend	on	system-specific	conditions.	 If	a	 full	
rollout	of	advanced	meters	(including	data	manage-
ment),	and	also	EV	charging	infrastructure	must	be	
provided	 in	 a	 timely	 fashion,	 advantages	 lie	 in	 the	
domain	 of	 the	 DSO.	 Regulators,	 however,	 have	 to	
take	care	not	to	foreclose	market	structures	through	
DSOs	becoming	incumbents	once	new	technologies	
are	deployed	at	scale	and	commercial	actors	want	to	
enter	the	market.
For	all	new	infrastructure	services	it	holds	that	when	
regulators	opt	for	implementing	these	new	tasks	via	
DSOs,	possible	repercussions	on	energy	and	power	
markets	have	to	be	ruled	out.	Retail	market	competi-
tion	and,	in	particular,	the	current	levels	of	unbun-
dling	 are	 not	 fully	 satisfactory.	With	 an	 increasing	
penetration	of	DER	and	the	accompanying	advent	of	
new	market	actors	and	business	relations,	the	nega-
tive	 effects	 of	 limited	 unbundling	 might	 become	
aggravated.	 When	 mandatory	 ownership	 unbun-
dling	 is	 politically	 not	 enforceable,	 or	 is	 economi-
cally	 counterproductive	 for	 the	 customers’	 choice	
(through	a	drastic	reduction	of	suppliers	on	the	mar-
ket)	or	for	the	customers’	bill	(through	duplication	
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of	costs	in	separated	entities	or	loss	of	synergy	with	
other	 local	 utility	 functions),	 stricter	 implementa-
tion	of	unbundling	requirements	and	market	trans-
parency	measures	should	be	mandated	as	more	re-
sponsibilities	are	given	to	DSOs.	At	the	same	time	it	
has	to	be	noted	that	before	investigating	new	forms	
of	 “Chinese	walls”,	 the	 implementation	of,	 and	 the	
compliance	with,	existing	unbundling	requirements	
have	to	be	reinforced.	
Hence	the	existing	unbundling	rules	place	minimum	
requirements	on	DSOs,	on	top	of	which	additional	
requirements	can	gradually	be	added	as	the	role	of	
respective	 DSOs	 changes	 with	 increasing	 penetra-
tion	 of	DER.	These	 additional	 requirements	 could	
mostly	center	around	the	use	of	customer	data	and	
transparency	 in	 procurement	 of	 services	 for	 DSO	
system	 operation.	 For	 instance,	 switching	 proce-
dures	should	include	clear	mechanisms	for	accessing	
commercial	information.	An	appropriate	data	man-
agement	procedure	should	guarantee	the	availability	
of	information	for	all	interested	market	players	(and	
especially	retailers),	to	the	extent	allowed	under	data	
protection	 legislation.	Strict	 supervision	by	 regula-
tory	agencies	is	necessary	to	prevent	potential	irreg-
ular	practices	and	furnish	advice	on	the	appropriate	
package	of	measures	to	be	finally	adopted.
It	 has	 to	 be	 discussed	 if	 small DSOs	 that	want	 to	
engage	in	additional	tasks	as	introduced	above,	but	
which	currently	might	be	exempted	from	strict	un-
bundling	 requirements,	 should	 also	 be	 exempted	
from	 additional	 “Chinese	 walls”	 that	 come	 with	
these	new	tasks.	On	this	level,	EU	and	national	regu-
lation	will	have	a	very	high	impact	on	local	govern-
ance	and	municipal	structures,	in	which	often	a	part	
of	 the	 profits	 from	 distribution	 activities	 are	 also	
used	for	municipal	social	activities.	Nonetheless,	all	
problems	arising	from	unbundling	likewise	apply	to	
small	DSOs.	If	general	exemptions	from	unbundling	
for	small	DSOs	prevail,	other	regulatory	means	gain	
in	 importance.	 Therefore,	 especially	 for	 small	 ex-
empted	DSOs,	new	ICT	or	EV	infrastructure	needs	
to	be	sufficiently	standardized	such	that	third	party	
market	entry	is	facilitated	as	far	as	possible	despite	
the	lack	of	unbundling.	Furthermore,	it	should	also	
hold	for	small	DSOs	that	market	data	relevant	to	ac-
cessing	 ICT	 infrastructure	 and	 finally	 relevant	 for	
trading	and	retailing	has	to	be	made	available	such	
that	barriers	to	market	entry	are	further	reduced.	
#4 – DSO activities vis-à-vis the TSO
When	moving	from	“passive	distribution	networks”	
towards	 “active	 distribution	 system	 management”,	
DSOs	 become	 more	 active	 system	 operators	 and	
the	existing	hosting	capacity	of	the	distribution	net-
work	can	be	used	more	efficiently	if	an	optimal	use	
of	 DER	 is	 considered.	Thus,	 DSOs	 become	 agents	
that	manage	 local	markets	 for	network	 services	 or	
directly	 purchase	 services	 with	 commercial	 value	
from	other	 agents,	 and	 their	 role	 and	organization	
will	 have	 an	 important	 impact	 on	 (retail)	 market	
functioning.	Thereby,	the	general	responsibilities	of	
network	operators	with	respect	to	grid	management	
do	not	change,	but	the	set	of	tools	available	to	per-
form	their	tasks	is	enriched	by	DER.	DER	can	offer	
a	range	of	products	to	manage	short-term	problems	
in	the	grid,	to	optimize	the	cost	of	maintaining	the	
desired	quality	of	service,	to	reduce	grid	losses	and	
to	reduce	or	postpone	future	grid	investment	needs.	
Some	 of	 these	 products	 are	 relevant	 for	 either	 the	
TSO	 or	 the	 DSO,	 whereas	 other	 types	 of	 services	
might	be	of	interest	for	both	types	of	network	opera-
tors.	Hence,	coordination	and	information	exchange	
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between	 TSOs	 and	 DSOs,	 from	 planning	 stage	 to	
operation,	will	play	a	particular	role	as	the	amount	
of	DER	increases	and	as	DSOs	become	more	active	
and	exploit	DER	services	closer	 to	 real-time	deliv-
ery.	Products	that	DSOs	and	TSOs	use	to	ensure	re-
liable	grids	(and	often	procure	for	this	sake)	should	
be	clearly	defined	in	terms	of	geography	and	timing.	
Wherever	DSOs	and	TSOs	in	principle	can	procure	
the	same	service,	a	more	clear	coordination	among	
DSOs	 and	 TSOs	 is	 needed	 the	more	 this	 product	
relates	to	real-time	trading.	Furthermore,	protocols	
have	 to	 be	 installed	 regarding	 which	 resource	 has	
sold	products	already,	to	whom,	and	for	what	time-
frame.	
Coordination	needs	will	differ	among	systems.	It	will	
make	a	difference	whether	a	distribution	system	con-
tains	only	an	insignificant	amount	of	DER,	whether	
in	contrast	there	is	a	large	penetration	of	distributed	
generation	 with	 installed	 capacities	 considerably	
exceeding	 peak	 demand,	 or	 whether	 it	 contains	 a	
whole	portfolio	of	DER	including	also	non-negligi-
ble	volumes	of	 local	 storage	 and	demand	 response	
potential.	Coordination	needs	will	be	higher	in	the	
latter	system.	Moreover,	regulation	or	coordination	
efforts	have	to	take	account	of	which	voltage	 levels	
are	 part	 of	 the	 distribution	 activity.	 Coordination	
needs	probably	will	increase	when	DSOs	also	oper-
ate	MV	(or	even	HV)	grids.	
A role for the EU to encourage good regu-
latory practice
In	the	European context,	regulation	has	to	be	in	line	
with	the	three	EU	energy	policy	pillars	and	be	kept	
at	minimum	 level,	 respecting	 the	principle	of	 sub-
sidiarity.	Accordingly,	we	 see	neither	 the	need	nor	
a	solid	 justification	for	an	EU-wide	comprehensive	
harmonization	of	the	regulation	of	DSOs,	although	
we	recommend	setting	clear	minimum	requirements	
in	a	few	key	regulatory	aspects,	as	well	as	the	publi-
cation	 of	 EU	 guidelines	 to	 spread,	 encourage,	 and	
monitor	 good	 regulatory	 practices	 in	 some	 of	 the	
critical	areas	that	have	been	identified	in	our	report.	
•	 National	regulators	can	benefit	from	sharing	
experiences	on	bad	and	good	practices.	EU	
guidelines	for	a	sound	regulation	and	adequate	
remuneration	of	DSOs	should	be	formulated,	
followed	by	regular	monitoring	and	benchmark-
ing	to	reveal	shortcomings	of	national	regula-
tory	approaches.	Similarly,	although	distribu-
tion	grid	tarification	is	–	and	should	remain	–	a	
national	issue,	again,	it	is	urgent	that	research	is	
conducted	to	develop	a	set	of	EU	guidelines	that	
should	be	published,	recommended	and	moni-
tored	to	reveal	shortcomings	of	national	regula-
tory	approaches	and	to	improve	tariff	design	
practices.	
•	 The	performance	of	new	business	models	and	
the	functioning	of	retail	market	competition	
rely	on	comprehensive	consumer	data.	The	EU	
should	provide	a	minimum	level	of	support	in	
that	respect,	mandating	–	provided	that	individ-
ual	consumers	give	their	authorization	for	the	
use	of	their	personal	profiles	–	that	consumer	
data	are	made	available	to	registered	agents.	The	
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definition	of	the	specific	format	of	data	provi-
sion	(i.e.	one	of	the	three	proposed	data	models,	
or	a	combination	thereof)	can	then	be	left	to	the	
Member	States.
•	 Depending	on	system	complexity	and	the	
number	of	tasks	to	be	accomplished	by	DSOs	
–	stricter	unbundling	requirements	should	be	
mandated.	As	system	complexity	increases,	an	
insufficiently	unbundled	DSO	could	either	stay	
with	a	restricted	set	of	tasks,	or	the	DSO	could	
expand	its	portfolio	of	activities,	but	accom-
panied	with	an	increasing	level	of	unbundling.	
Increasing	levels	of	unbundling	could	be	im-
plemented	by	“higher	Chinese	walls”	between	
DSOs	and	their	subsidiary	retailers	that	engage	
in	trading	of	distributed	sources.	The	EU	should	
provide	guidelines	for	measures	to	reinforce	
“Chinese	walls”	between	any	DSO	and	the	DER-
related	businesses	that	may	exist	under	the	same	
holding	that	owns	the	DSO.
•	 If	general	exemptions	from	unbundling	for	
small	DSOs	prevail,	additional	regulatory	means	
gain	in	importance.	Therefore,	especially	for	
small	exempted	DSOs,	new	ICT	or	EV	infra-
structure	needs	to	be	sufficiently	standardized	
such	that	third	party	market	entry	is	facilitated	
as	far	as	possible	despite	the	lack	of	unbundling.	
Furthermore,	it	should	also	hold	for	small	DSOs	
that	market	data	relevant	to	accessing	this	ICT	
infrastructure	and	finally	relevant	for	trading	
and	retailing	has	to	be	made	available	such	that	
barriers	to	market	entry	are	further	reduced.	
•	 Finally,	procedures	and	principles	of	coordina-
tion	between	DSOs	and	TSOs	also	should	be	
defined	at	a	European	level	in	order	to	avoid	
distortions	in	competition	and	barriers	for	
market	entry	due	to	different	rules	and	market	
designs	in	different	Member	States.	The	possible	
set	of	distribution	company	functions	needs	to	
be	extended.	Also	the	currently	developed	EU	
network	codes	should	take	account	of	the	need	
for	coordination	and	rules	among	system	opera-
tors	that	rely	on	DER	services.	
Necessary	regulatory	actions	must	be	developed	in	
a	 timely	 manner	 in	 order	 to	 minimize	 regulatory	
risk	and	barriers	and	increase	 investment	activities	
in	distribution	and	retail	market	 segments	as	 soon	
as	possible.
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